

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BONN 17154 01 OF 02 281946Z

41

ACTION SCI-06

INFO OCT-01 EA-11 IO-14 ISO-00 EB-11 COME-00 TRSE-00 OMB-01

PM-07 NSC-10 SPC-03 SS-20 RSC-01 DODE-00 EUR-25 AEC-11

AECE-00 NSF-04 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DRC-01 ACDA-19 CIAE-00

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 SCEM-02 INRE-00 /160 W

----- 104112

O R 281821Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8945

INFO AMEMBASSY BERN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MADRID

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 17154

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: TECH, GW, EEC, XT

SUBJECT: URANIUM ENRICHMENT -- US POLICY REASSESSMENT

REF: A. PARIS 30317, B. BONN 17021 (NOTAL),

C. EC BRUSSELS 6778

1. SUMMARY: EMBASSY BONN ENDORSES REF A AND REF C
APPEALS FOR REASSESSMENT OF US POLICY ON INTERNATIONAL
URANIUM ENRICHMENT SERVICES. WE SHARE EC BRUSSELS
CONCLUSION THAT PRESENT US STRATEGY IS NOT RPT NOT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 17154 01 OF 02 281946Z

COMPLETELY INTEGRATED INTO OUR OVERALL NATIONAL POLICY

AND JOIN AMBASSADOR IRWIN IN HIS RECOMMENDATION THAT THE US SUPPORT HIGH-LEVEL EUROPEAN ASPIRATIONS FOR ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES. FROM OUR VIEWPOINT HERE IN THE FRG, WE SUGGEST THAT THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF REF A RE US COOPERATION WITH FRENCH GASEOUS DIFFUSION TECHNOLOGY BE EXPANDED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE TRIPARTITE GAS CENTRIFUGE PROGRAM AND POLITICAL DECISIONS WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES WHICH WILL PROBABLY ENDORSE "CONCERTED" DEVELOPMENT OF THESE TWO PROCESSES. WE PROPOSE THAT US INITIATIVES BE TAKEN AT THE HIGHEST POLITICAL LEVELS OF THE EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS AND SUGGEST, IF POSSIBLE, SOME REFERENCE TO COOPERATIVE ENERGY PROGRAM IN THE US/EC DECLARATION. ALL US-EUROPEAN COOPERATION IN THESE ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES SHOULD, OF COURSE, BE NEGOTIATED TO INSURE RECIPROCAL BENEFITS AND ADEQUATE PROTECTION FOR SENSITIVE DATA. END SUMMARY.

2. THE EMBASSY ENDORSES THE ESSENTIAL CONCLUSIONS REACHED BY AMBASSADOR IRWIN IN REFERENCE A. WE CONCUR THAT THE US MUST NOT RPT NOT REMAIN ALOOF. WE SHOULD ACT EFFECTIVELY TO MAINTAIN AND TO EXPAND OUR INFLUENCE IN EUROPEAN ENERGY POLICY, TO MAINTAIN AN OPEN EUROPEAN URANIUM MARKET, TO GET A FAIR SHARE FOR THE US, TO PREVENT EXCESSIVE USSR PENETRATION OF THIS MARKET AND, CONCEIVABLY, TO BENEFIT FROM THE TECHNOLOGIES DEVELOPED INDEPENDENTLY IN EUROPE.

3. THE RECENT FRENCH DECISION (PARIS 30210) SEEMS TO INSURE THAT FRENCH GASEOUS DIFFUSION TECHNOLOGY WILL BE USED FOR A RELATIVELY LARGE-SCALE PLANT IN EUROPE. AT THE SAME TIME, THE CONFIDENT DETERMINATION OF THE TRIPARTITE GAS CENTRIFUGE GROUP AND RELEVANT DECISIONS WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES ALSO SEEM TO INSURE THIS COMPETING TECHNOLOGY ITS PLACE IN THE EUROPEAN SCENE. AMBASSADOR IRWIN'S ASSESSMENT BECOMES EVEN MORE VALID, WE BELIEVE, IF EXPANDED AT EACH POINT TO NOTE THAT -- LIKE IT OR NOT -- IT SEEMS PROBABLE THAT TWO URANIUM ENRICHMENT TECHNOLOGIES WILL BE EMPLOYED IN EUROPE BY THE VERY LATE 1970'S OR EARLY 1980'S. WITH
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BONN 17154 01 OF 02 281946Z

AMBASSADOR IRWIN, WE VIEW US ADVANCED TECHNOLOGICAL COMPETENCE -- BUT IN BOTH THESE TECHNOLOGIES -- AS A MAJOR TRUMP CARD WE HAVE YET TO PLAY.

4. WE MUST ACT EFFECTIVELY. THE EUROPEAN RECEPTION OF OUR 1971 OFFER SUGGESTS THAT EVEN THEN IT WAS TOO LITTLE TOO LATE. THE FIRM FRENCH DECISION TO CONSTRUCT ANOTHER GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT IN EUROPE IMPLIES THAT

ANY MULTI-NATIONAL RESPONSE THAT MAY YET BE MADE TO
THIS US OFFER (OR TO OUR RESUMED GASEOUS DIFFUSION
INITIATIVE IF THIS IS TO BE INDEPENDENT OF EURODIF)
MAY NOT RPT NOT PREVENT THE DEVELOPMENT OF A EUROPEAN
URANIUM POLICY WHICH IS DETRIMENTAL TO US INTERESTS.
WE NEED TO BE FORCEFUL AND EVEN MORE OPEN AND
FORTHCOMING WITH OUR PROPOSAL AND WE SHOULD CHOOSE OUR
CHANNELS CAREFULLY. EMBASSY WISHES TO EMPHASIZE: WE DO
NOT RPT NOT SEE THE US AS A SUPPLIANT BEGGAR. WE ARE
RECOMMENDING A POSITIVE POLICY -- THAT OUR TRUMP CARD
OF EXCELLENCE IN TWO URANIUM ENRICHMENT TECHNOLOGIES

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BONN 17154 02 OF 02 281953Z

51

ACTION SCI-06

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 EA-11 IO-14 ISO-00 EB-11 COME-00 TRSE-00

OMB-01 PM-07 NSC-10 SPC-03 SS-20 RSC-01 DODE-00 AEC-11

AECE-00 NSF-04 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DRC-01 ACDA-19 CIAE-00

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 SCEM-02 INRE-00 /160 W

----- 104213

O R 281821Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8946

INFO AMEMBASSY BERN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MADRID

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 17154

BE PLAYED BOLDLY AND AT POLITICAL LEVEL HIGH ENOUGH TO MINIMIZE ANY CHARGE OF DISRUPTIVE TACTICS DESIGNED ONLY TO SPOIL EUROPE'S OWN GAME.

5. WE RECOGNIZE THAT US COOPERATION WITH THE FRG/UK/ DUTCH TRIPARTITE GAS CENTRIFUGE PROJECT MAY RAISE DIFFICULT AND AS YET UNEXPLORED QUESTIONS ABOUT CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES, ABOUT PROTECTION OF A TECHNOLOGY WHICH MAY BE PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE FROM A CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 17154 02 OF 02 281953Z

PROLIFERATION STANDPOINT AND WHETHER THIS PROCESS IS YET TECHNOLOGICALLY RIPE FOR DISCUSSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. WE NOTE IN THIS CONTEXT THAT WE WOULD FORESEE NO PROBLEMS WITH THE FRG IN PARTICULAR OR WITH THEIR TRIPARTITE PARTNERS IN OPENING THESE TALKS. CERTAINLY, WE WOULD NOT RPT NOT ANTICIPATE ANY NEED TO CATER TO THEIR "GRANDEUR" OR TO DENY THE US ADEQUATE AND PUBLIC CREDIT FOR OUR CONTRIBUTIONS TO A JOINT PROJECT. WE WOULD ANTICIPATE DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT THE EXCHANGE OF TECHNOLOGY, BUT ARE CONFIDENT THAT "YANKEE" INGENUITY WOULD PROTECT US AND INSURE AN ADEQUATE RETURN TO THE US. WE HOPE THAT THE RECENT US RESPONSE TO EUROPEAN UTILITIES DOES IMPLY US WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF EUROPE IN A GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT TO BE CONSTRUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR OWN CONSENSUS. IF WE PLOT DISRUPTION, A QUESTION IMPLICIT IN BOTH REFS A AND C, THE EMBASSY SERIOUSLY QUESTIONS THE WISDOM OF SUCH A POLICY AT THIS LATE DATE. IT WOULD BE DOOMED TO FAILURE, IN ANY EVENT. HOWEVER, WERE WE TO PARTICIPATE ONLY IN THE FRENCH EURODIF GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT, AND THUS INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF ITS SUCCESS IN THE EUROPEAN COMPETITION WITH THE URENCO GAS CENTRIFUGE PROJECT, IT IS EASILY POSSIBLE THAT THE TRIPARTITE NATIONS WOULD VIEW THIS AS AN UNFRIENDLY ACT FROM A TECHNOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW. IF THE US COOPERATES WITH ONE EUROPEAN TECHNOLOGY FOR URANIUM ENRICHMENT, WE BELIEVE THE US SHOULD JOIN BOTH. IN THIS WAY WE WOULD MAXIMIZE OUR NET RETURN FROM THE FOREIGN POLICY BENEFITS EXCELLENTLY SUMMARIZED BY AMBASSADOR IRWIN IN PARA 8 OF REF. A.

6. WE ASSUME THAT THE US WOULD, AS OFFERED IN THE CABLE TO WYART, ASSOCIATE ITS PROPOSALS FOR COOPERATION WITH EUROPE WITH SOME RELAXATION OF AEC TERMS AND

CONDITIONS FOR URANIUM ENRICHMENT SERVICES PENDING
COMPLETION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. IF SO, WE WOULD SLOW
DOWN SOVIET PENETRATION OF THE EUROPEAN MARKET AND TAKE
A FIRST STEP TOWARD DEVELOPMENT OF A COORDINATED
WORLD-WIDE ENERGY RESOURCE SUPPLY SYSTEM WHICH WOULD
ULTIMATELY INCLUDE BOTH US AND EUROPEAN ENRICHMENT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BONN 17154 02 OF 02 281953Z

PLANTS.

7. WE RECOMMEND, THEREFORE, THAT ANY REASSESSMENT OF
US INTERNATIONAL URANIUM ENRICHMENT POLICY CAREFULLY
EXAMINE THE POSSIBILITY OF OFFERING US COOPERATION
IN THE URENCO GAS CENTRIFUGE PROJECT, AS WELL AS IN
THE FRENCH EURODIF GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT. THIS
EXAMINATION SHOULD, OF COURSE, CONSIDER THE MOST
EFFECTIVE CHANNELS THROUGH WHICH TO WORK IN
EXPLORING THIS POSSIBILITY. WE ENDORSE THE
RECOMMENDATION OF USEC BRUSSELS THAT SUCH
QUESTIONS BE DISCUSSED WITH GOVERNMENTS AT THE HIGHEST
LEVELS. WE ALSO SUGGEST THAT AN APPROPRIATE REFERENCE
TO US-EUROPEAN COOPERATION IN ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES BE
INCORPORATED, IF POSSIBLE, IN THE US/EC
DECLARATION NOW UNDER NEGOTIATION.
HILLENBRAND

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: URANIUM, NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, NUCLEAR FUELS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 28 NOV 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: garlanwa
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973BONN17154
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: n/a
From: BONN
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t1973119/aaaaagee.tel
Line Count: 252
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION SCI
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: A. PARIS 30317, B. BONN 17021 (NOTAL,)
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: garlanwa
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 22 AUG 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <22-Aug-2001 by martinml>; APPROVED <26-Sep-2001 by garlanwa>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: URANIUM ENRICHMENT -- US POLICY REASSESSMENT
TAGS: TECH, GE, XT, US, EEC
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005